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Follow the Giraffe’s Lead – Lanco, Inc. v. Director, 
Division of Taxation Gets Lost in the Quagmire that 
is State Taxation 
Cory D. Olson* 
When there is an income tax, the just will pay more and the unjust less.1 
I.  PIPE DREAMS OR A PIPELINE?  LANCO, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CREATION OF TAX 
FREE INCOME. 
Everyone is familiar with Benjamin Franklin’s admonition 
that nothing in this world is certain, except for death and taxes.  
In fact, one wonders whether humankind has spent more time 
searching for the Fountain of Youth or the perfect tax loophole.  
While both endeavors have been fruitless, modern tax planners 
have found a system which goes a long way toward achieving 
one of these two goals.  Using confusing and ambiguous 
Supreme Court precedent as a cover, tax planners have found a 
method of structuring assets that has the potential to save 
companies millions of dollars in state taxation.  It is 
accomplished through a tax tool known as a “passive 
investment company,” or “PIC.”  Combining the potential value 
of intellectual property, the relative ease of creating and 
maintaining subsidiary corporations, and favorable state tax 
laws, companies have been able to use PICs to effectively shift 
their income out of one state and into the state with the most 
favorable tax laws, generally resulting in complete avoidance of 
                                                 
 *  J.D. Expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School.  I would 
like to thank my parents for their never ending support, Carole Clark Isakson 
for bringing this case to my attention, Sarah N. Andersen for listening to my 
ideas even if none of it made any sense to her, and most of all God for opening 
all of the doors in my life.   
 1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, I.20 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Willey Book Co. 
1901). 
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state corporate income tax.  Recognizing the threat to tax 
revenue this method poses, states have taken steps to 
recapture the income and re-subject it to state taxation.  The 
PICs and their holders have fought back, claiming that the 
income derived from the intellectual property is outside of the 
permissible reach of a state’s taxing powers.2 
Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation3 is one of the 
most recent salvos in the battle over whether a state can 
constitutionally tax income shifted to a PIC.  Lanco, Inc. was 
incorporated in 1982 in Delaware.4  Lanco and Lane Bryant, 
Inc., a national clothing retailer, are members of the same 
corporate family, each ultimately owned by The Limited, Inc.5  
After Lanco was incorporated, Lane Bryant assigned its 
trademark “Lane Bryant,” together with the goodwill it had 
developed, to Lanco for little or no consideration.6  Lanco 
immediately licensed this intangible property back to Lane 
Bryant for use in its operations, including operations taking 
place in New Jersey.7  In exchange for the license, Lane Bryant 
paid Lanco a royalty of 5.5% of the gross retail sales made by 
Lane Bryant.8  Using this agreement as a jurisdictional hook, 
the New Jersey Division of Taxation assessed Lanco with the 
Corporate Business Tax,9 the state’s corporate income tax, for 
income Lanco derived from the royalties paid by Lane Bryant.10  
                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J. 
Tax Ct. 2003); Geoffrey Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993). 
 3.  21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003). 
 4. Secretary of Revenue v. A&F Trademark, Inc., Admin. Decision No. 
381 at 8 (N.C. Tax Review Bd. May 7 2002), available at 
http://www.dor.state.nc.us/practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.
pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). 
 5. Id.  The Limited, Inc. is an Ohio corporation which specializes in retail 
clothing.  Originally formed in 1963, The Limited, Inc. has expanded to 
include twelve retailers and a combined total of more than five thousand 
stores nationwide.  The Limited, Inc. retailers include the well-known names 
Abercrombie & Fitch, Express, and Victoria’s Secret.  Id. at 3-4; A & F 
Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. App. 2004). 
 6. Secretary of Revenue, Admin. Decision No. 381 at 8.  
 7. See id. at 16; Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Comm’n at 2, 
Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. Of Taxation, No. A-3285-03T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. filed 2004), available at 
http://www.mtc.gov/POLICY/LancoAmicusBriefFinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 
2005) [hereinafter Multistate Brief]. 
 8. Multistate Brief, supra note 7, at 3. 
 9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-1-41 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004). 
 10. While the two corporations are affiliated, this relationship ultimately 
has no effect on whether Lanco should be subject to taxation.  It is important, 
however, to understand this relationship when analyzing the practical effects 
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Lanco protested, claiming that since it did not have a physical 
presence in New Jersey, a fact which New Jersey did not 
contest, the state could not constitutionally assess the tax.11  
The Division of Taxation disagreed with Lanco’s assertion that 
it must be physically present in order to be taxed and argued 
that the license agreement alone brought Lanco within the 
state’s taxing jurisdiction.12 
The case boiled down to one question: does a company 
whose sole connection with a state is a licensing agreement on 
intellectual property located within the state have a sufficient 
nexus with the state such that it may be subject to state income 
taxes?13  Intellectual property can be a company’s top asset 
and, as a result, can be strategically used to avoid taxation, 
such as through a PIC.14  Whether in the form of registered 
trademarks, patents, copyrights, or simply “goodwill,” every 
company is going to have some form of intellectual property.  If 
a simple licensing agreement is enough to avoid state taxation, 
then every business, every patent holder, artist, or other owner 
of intellectual property can dodge New Jersey taxation.  The 
level of revenue at stake is anything but inconsequential.  With 
states facing declining revenues, PICs threatening to exempt 
millions in taxes, and few options to address the problem other 
than through direct taxation, the ultimate outcome of Lanco 
carried a large potential impact for tax payers and tax 
assessors alike. 
This goal of this Comment is to demonstrate why Lanco 
and other PICs should be subject to state taxation.  Despite the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that state taxation cases 
represent something of a “quagmire,”15 this Comment will first 
unravel the cases and explain the basic parameters that 
confine state taxation.  Next, the comment will discuss how 
other courts have addressed the same question at issue in 
                                                                                                         
of the Lanco decision and how courts should consider similar future issues. 
 11. See Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 216 (N.J. 
Tax Ct. 2003); Multistate Brief, supra note 7, at 4. 
 12. See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 215-16. 
 13. See id. at 200. 
 14. See George T. Bell et al., A State Tax Strategy for Trademarks, 81 
Trademark Rep. 445, 445 (1991). 
 15. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).  The Supreme 
Court conceded that the law regarding interstate taxation is something of a 
“quagmire . . . [leaving] much room for controversy and confusion and little in 
the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable 
power of taxation.”  Id. at 215-16 (quoting Northwestern States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)). 
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Lanco and how courts and commentators have reacted to those 
decisions.  Third, this comment will analyze the Lanco decision 
and will explain why the Lanco court decided the case 
incorrectly.  This Comment will show that even having 
incorrectly required a physical presence, the Lanco court still 
should have decided in New Jersey’s favor; however, the court 
incorrectly read Supreme Court precedent and applied the 
incorrect test.  Having made these two critical errors, this 
Comment concludes that the Lanco court reached the wrong 
outcome and prevented New Jersey from subjecting Lanco, or 
any other PIC or similar tax device, to the state business 
income tax. 
 
II.  STATE TAXATION AND ITS CONFINES – UNRAVELING 
THE QUAGMIRE THAT IS STATE TAXATION 
A.  EARLY VIEWS OF INTERSTATE TAXATION 
After the Revolutionary War, a young nation discovered 
that it was not a unified country but an association of 
independent states organized under the Articles of 
Confederation.  As a result of this independence, states were 
free to tax imports and exports as if the states were 
independent countries.16  This independence inevitably caused 
deep animosity between the states and in turn threatened the 
emerging nation.17  Seeking to address the failures of the 
Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress gave 
Congress the sole power to regulate trade “among the several 
states.”18  Not only was this sole power an affirmative grant of 
power, but it contained an implied limit on state power as well.  
This negative power, known as the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
prohibits certain state acts that interfere with interstate 
commerce.19 
Early challenges to state taxation of interstate business 
took advantage of the Supreme Court’s laissez faire 
interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, which 
                                                 
 16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 274 (James Madison) (Random 
House 1937). 
 17. See id.  
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 19. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
222, 231-232, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring)); South Carolina State 
Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938). 
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prohibited any taxation of interstate goods or services.20  
Congress alone possessed the power to regulate interstate 
commerce and any form of taxation by the states encroached 
upon this power.21  This general prohibition on interstate 
taxation continued for nearly seventy-five years, lasting into 
the 1890s.22  Around the turn of the century, the Court began to 
retreat from its earlier philosophy.  For example, in Adams 
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor,23 the Court upheld a tax 
based on the apportioned market value of a corporation, which 
included goodwill derived from instate transactions, even 
though it was a tax on interstate activity.24  This ushered in an 
era in which concern shifted away from protecting interstate 
commerce from any tax burden to a system that ensured that 
interstate commerce was only subject to one state’s taxes.25 
By the middle of the twentieth century, states were again 
expanding their taxing jurisdiction to include entities located 
outside of their respective territorial boundaries.26  At this 
                                                 
 20. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 448 (1827) (“Any charge on the 
introduction and incorporation of the articles into and with the mass of 
property in the country, must be hostile to the power given to Congress to 
regulate commerce, since an essential part of that regulation, and principal 
object of it, is to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing that 
introduction and incorporation.”). 
 21. See id. at 447-48. 
 22. See, e.g., Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“In our 
opinion such a construction of the Constitution leads to the conclusion that no 
State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, . . . and 
the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to 
a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.”). 
 23. 165 U.S. 194 (1897). 
 24. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220-21 (1897). 
 25. See W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258 (1938).   
But we think the [gross receipts] tax assailed here finds support in 
reason, and in the practical needs of a taxing system which, under 
constitutional limitations, must accommodate itself to the double 
demand that interstate business shall pay its way, and that at the 
same time it shall not be burdened with cumulative exactions which 
are not similarly laid on local business. 
Id. 
 26. See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342-43 (1954). 
In the last twenty years, revenue needs have come to exceed the 
demands that legislatures feel it expedient to make upon 
accumulated wealth or property with fixed location within the state.  
The states therefore have turned to taxing activities connected with 
the movement of commerce, such as exchange and consumption.  If 
there is some jurisdictional fact or event to serve as a conductor, the 
reach of the state’s taxing power may be carried to objects of taxation 
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point, state jurisdictional powers met up against the second 
constitutional restriction: the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.27  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
due process was concerned with territorial restrictions; thus, 
states were prevented from asserting jurisdiction outside of 
their borders.28  This did not mean businesses located outside of 
a state’s borders were exempt from taxation.  States were still 
allowed to tax interstate commerce so long as there was “some 
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and 
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,”29 and “the 
state [had] given anything for which it [could] ask in return.”30  
According to this formula, a state could only tax that which was 
located inside its borders.  This view was based on the belief 
that a state provides benefits to those who were located there 
and that the residents could be forced to pay their share of the 
cost for these protections.31  Thus, as states were allowed to 
expand their reach to include non-citizens,32 the Court required 
                                                                                                         
beyond its borders. 
Id. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 28. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45. 
 29. Id. 
 30. State of Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).  
  
 31. See id. at 445 (stating that the test was a reformulation of the classic 
approach in Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932)).  According 
to the Lawrence Court, 
[t]he obligation of one domiciled within a state to pay taxes there, 
arises from unilateral action of the state government in the exercise 
of the most plenary of sovereign powers, that to raise revenue to 
defray the expenses of government and to distribute its burdens 
equably among those who enjoy its benefits. Hence, domicile in itself 
establishes a basis for taxation.  Enjoyment of the privileges of 
residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the 
protection of its laws, are inseparable from the responsibility for 
sharing the costs of government. 
Lawrence, 286 U.S. at 279.  The reformulation found in Wisconsin v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 323 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), extended this concept of 
domicile as a basis for taxation to an entity operating within the physical 
boundaries of a state being responsible to help defray the governmental 
expenses.  Presumably, an entity which was not a domiciliary of a state but 
which simply entered a state’s jurisdiction would not be subject to taxation 
since the state government would not be providing any protections. 
 32. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 342-43.  The Miller Bros. Court stated: 
visible territorial boundaries do not always establish the limits of a 
state’s taxing power or jurisdiction  . . . If there is some jurisdictional 
fact or event to serve as a conductor, the reach of the state’s taxing 
power may be carried to objects of taxation beyond its borders . . . .  
[I]f [a state] has jurisdiction of [an entity’s] taxable property or 
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a showing of a territorial link between the state and the taxed 
entity, a restriction consistent with the then current notions of 
territorial jurisdiction.33  Once this territorial connection was 
found, however, all of an entity’s in-state activities could be 
taxed, even if those activities were not directly related to the 
physical presence.34 
B.  THE COMPLETE AUTO PRONGS – THE CONCEPTS COME 
TOGETHER 
 In the 1977 case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady35 
the Due Process and Commerce Clause considerations were 
synthesized into a seemingly straightforward four-prong test.36  
Under the Complete Auto test, a tax will be sustained if it (1) is 
fairly apportioned; (2) does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce; (3) is fairly related to the services provided by the 
state; and (4) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus 
to the taxing state.37  Dormant Commerce Clause concerns are 
addressed by the first two prongs of the test.  Fair 
apportionment, the first prong, prevents states from 
overreaching and taxing activities unconnected with the state.   
Reaching a determination of whether a tax is fairly 
apportioned under the first prong of the Complete Auto test is a 
two step process.  First, the court must decide whether the tax 
is “internally” consistent.38  “Internal consistency is preserved 
                                                                                                         
transactions, it may sometimes, through these, reach the nonresident. 
Id. 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 347 (holding that a store which sold goods to Maryland 
residents but did not enter Maryland was not subject to forced collection of use 
taxes); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960) (holding that the 
presence of independent contractors was sufficient to subject the entity to 
state taxation); National Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 
551, 552, 562 (1977) (holding that the maintenance of two offices with two to 
four employees each was sufficient to give California the power to tax all of 
National Geographic’s activities within the state). 
 34.  See, e.g., National Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 561 (holding that 
physical presence of offices creating jurisdiction hook to tax all in state 
magazine sales); D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (upholding 
assessment of use tax based on value of magazines sent from out of state against 
physically present retailer); Department of Revenue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 660 P.2d 
1188 (Alaska 1983) (upholding assessment of sales tax on mail orders sent from out of 
state center of physically present retailer).    
 35. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 36. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279 (1977). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 
(1995). 
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when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by 
every other State would add no burden to interstate commerce 
that intrastate commerce would not also bear.”39  This test does 
not look to the economic reality of the tax, but merely whether 
the imposition of the exact formula in every other state would 
place a greater burden on interstate commerce than on 
intrastate commerce.40  If this test is met, a court then looks to 
see whether the tax is “externally” consistent.41  “External 
consistency . . . looks not to the logical consequences of cloning, 
but to the economic justification for the State’s claim upon the 
value taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond 
that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic 
activity within the taxing State.”42  External consistency looks 
for a real threat of multiple taxation, even if it is not through 
identical statutes.43  Such a threat may be a sign that one state 
is overreaching its fair portion of income attributable to that 
state.44 
Moving to the second prong, state taxes may not 
discriminate against interstate commerce.  While in some ways 
this test is similar to the apportionment tests under the first 
prong,45 this test is broader, as it checks for all forms of 
discrimination against interstate or out-of-state activities.46  
For example, a state may not tax interstate commerce or 
activities occurring wholly in another state at a higher rate 
than what local activities are charged.47 
                                                 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  For an example of a tax that is externally inconsistent, see Am. 
Trucking Ass’n. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (invalidating a flat tax as 
discriminatory against interstate commerce). 
 41. Okla. Tax Comm., 514 U.S. at 185. 
 42. Id.  
  
 43. See id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. By subjecting the interstate operator to a higher tax burden, the state 
is discriminating in favor of the intrastate carrier.  Whether it is using a tax 
structure that subjects the interstate carrier to higher taxes (internal 
consistency) or using a system that possibly subjects income to double taxation 
(external consistency), the main concern is discrimination.  
 46. Okla. Tax Comm., 514 U.S. at 197-98. 
 47. See e.g., American Trucking Ass’n. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 266-67 
(1987) (holding a flat tax discriminatory because it subjects interstate carriers 
to a higher per-mile fee than intrastate carriers); Boston Stock Exch. v. State 
Tax Comm’n., 429 U.S. 318319, 337 (1977) (holding a taxing scheme which 
charged out-of-state sales on securities transactions a higher tax as 
discrimination against interstate activities). 
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The third and fourth prongs, fair relation and substantial 
nexus, ensure that the state remains within the confines of the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the second limit on 
interstate taxation.48  Consistent with the old territorial limits 
of due process, the fourth prong requires a “definite link” or 
ensures there is a “minimum connection between a state and 
the person, property or transaction.”49  The third prong 
requires a rational relationship between the tax and the 
activities connected with the state.50   
While the Complete Auto prongs remained grounded in the 
territorial based taxation restrictions, the rest of the due 
process jurisprudence moved away from the old territorial 
limits towards the goal of “fair play and substantial justice.”51  
The notion of “presence” for jurisdictional due process broke out 
of its territorial mold and turned upon a determination of 
whether an entity had purposely availed itself of the 
protections of the jurisdiction.52  Taxation due process, 
however, continued to rely on a showing of physical presence.  
Therefore, after Complete Auto, a disconnect formed between 
personal jurisdiction due process, which extended to entities 
that had purposefully availed themselves of the protections of 
the jurisdiction, and taxation due process, which stopped at the 
borders. 
C.  THE CHANGE IN DUE PROCESS: DOES IT CHANGE THE 
COMPLETE AUTO TEST? 
The expanded jurisdictional due process limits challenged 
the validity of prior taxation cases which were based on the 
older, territorial notions of the Due Process Clause.  The 
Supreme Court addressed this question in the 1992 case Quill 
                                                 
 48. The third prong is derived from the territorial notions of the Due 
Process Clause.  It was this territorial presence of the taxed entity which 
determined whether it was within the taxing jurisdiction or not.  See supra 
notes 28-34 and accompanying text.  The fourth prong flows from the language 
in Miller Bros. and Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.  See supra notes 26-30 and 
accompanying text. 
 49. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992); Miller Bros. v. 
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). 
 50. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 
(1978). 
 51. International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 52. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1985). 
OLSON_4_24_2005 7/11/2006  6:47:00 PM 
2005] LANCO, INC 110 
 
Corp. v. North Dakota.53  Quill, which did not own any tangible 
property in North Dakota, sold office products across the 
United States, including North Dakota, which were delivered to 
customers via common carrier.54  North Dakota sought to 
require Quill to charge North Dakotans a use tax which Quill 
would then remit to the state.55  Factually, the case was 
indistinguishable from National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois.56  In that case, the Court 
used territorial notions of due process to hold that Illinois could 
not force Bellas Hess to charge such a tax because it lacked 
physical presence in the state.57  North Dakota argued that 
modern due process left Bellas Hess untenable.58 
The Court half agreed.  Instead of completely overturning 
or affirming Bellas Hess, the Quill Court split the “substantial 
nexus” prong of the four-part Complete Auto Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady59 test.60  Rather than determining 
whether there is a sufficient nexus in order to meet due process 
requirements, the Court required that taxpayers have a 
substantial nexus under a Commerce Clause analysis.61  “Thus 
the ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like due process’ 
‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather 
a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”62  
The Court reinterpreted its original Bellas Hess holding.  It 
overruled the due process portion of Bellas Hess, but kept its 
Commerce Clause holding.  Now, instead of being exempt to 
taxes due to its lack of due process, Bellas Hess was exempt 
from state taxes because it did not have a “substantial nexus” 
in the form of physical presence under a Commerce Clause 
analysis. 
Just like Bellas Hess, Quill had purposely availed itself of 
the state, and so met modern due process requirements.63  The 
question thus was whether the Commerce Clause analysis 
                                                 
 53. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 54. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302. 
 55. Id. at 302-03. 
 56. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 57. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 
758-60 (1967).   
 58.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
 59. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 60.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305, 312.  
 61.  See id. at 308, 314. 
 62. Id. at 302-03. 
 63. Id. at 308. 
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would require a showing of physical presence, as the Court had 
required in Bellas Hess.  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that it did not, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and 
retained the physical presence requirement, no longer to meet 
due process, but to serve the Commerce Clause.64  Since Quill 
did not have a substantial physical presence in North Dakota, 
it lacked the requisite “substantial nexus” and thus could not 
be subject to taxation.65  In retaining the physical presence 
requirement the Court admitted that were the case decided 
today, it may come out differently, but principles of stare decisis 
weighed heavily upon it.  As a result, the Court decided to 
maintain the Bellas Hess bright-line, physical presence 
requirement, albeit under a different restrictive banner.66  
Possibly in recognition of this dissonance between today’s likely 
outcome and the commands of precedent, the Court expressly 
limited its holding to sales and use taxes and left open for the 
lower courts the question of whether the same requirement 
would apply to other forms of taxes.67 
It is important to note that under Quill’s “substantial 
nexus” requirement, a de minimis physical presence is 
insufficient; the test requires a “substantial connection between 
the entity and the state–the “substantial nexus.”  The parties 
agreed that Quill possessed property within the state of North 
Dakota in the form of licensed software copied on floppy 
diskettes which were provided to customers.68  The Court 
recognized that the presence of this intellectual property 
created some nexus between Quill and North Dakota, but while 
this property “might constitute some minimal nexus,” it was 
                                                 
 64. Id. at 314-19. 
 65. It is important to note that the Quill court recognized that physical 
presence alone was not sufficient to provide the requisite substantial nexus.  
The parties agreed that Quill in fact did possess property within the state of 
North Dakota in the form of licensed software which located on floppy 
diskettes which were provided to customers.  Id. at 315 n.8.  It should also be 
noted that the trial court found that the title to the goods being shipped by 
common carrier passed from Quill to the purchaser at the point the 
merchandise was received.  This would suggest that Quill also possessed a 
cumulative total of nearly $1 million dollars throughout the year.  Id. at 302. 
 66. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. 
 67. Id. at 314, 317. 
 68. Id. at 315, n.8.  It should also be noted that the trial court found that 
the title to the goods being shipped by common carrier passed from Quill to 
the purchaser at the point the merchandise was received.  This would suggest 
that Quill also possessed a cumulative total of nearly one million dollars 
throughout the year.  The Court did not mention this property in any of its 
analysis and did not appear to consider it in determining a substantial nexus. 
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insufficient to create the requisite jurisdictional hook.69  So, 
while intellectual property had created a nexus, “Quill’s 
licensing of software . . . [did] not meet the ‘substantial nexus’ 
requirement of the Commerce Clause.”70 
D.  PICS – CREATING THE PERFECT TAX LOOPHOLE 
In order to fully understand the taxation issues 
surrounding PICs, it is important to understand what they are 
and how they operate.  Passive Investment Companies (PICs), 
also known as Delaware Holding Companies, Intangible 
Holding Subsidiaries, or Intellectual Property Holding 
Companies, among other possible names, are subsidiary 
corporations whose sole purpose is to hold and manage the 
intellectual property of a related corporation.  In addition to 
providing business benefits, such as making it easier for a 
corporation to manage its intellectual property, protecting 
members of the corporate family from creditors and lawsuits, 
and hindering hostile takeovers, the PICs may create 
substantial tax benefits.71  First, the parent company, the 
original owner of some form of intellectual property, creates a 
wholly-owned subsidiary.72  Next, the subsidiary agrees to 
exchange its stock for the parent’s intellectual property.73  At 
the same time, the subsidiary licenses the intellectual property 
back to the parent, the original holder, in exchange for royalty 
payments.74  Ideally, these royalty payments are just below the 
parent’s net profit margin.75  The effect of this system is to 
convert what would be profit into a royalty payment passed 
onto the PIC.  By forming the subsidiary in a state which does 
not tax holding companies (Delaware), does not tax royalties 
                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
  
 71. Pamela S. Chestek, Control of Trademarks by the Intellectual Property 
Holding Company, 41 IDEA 1, 1 (2001).  The actual formation and 
maintenance of a PIC can involve substantial tax and trademark issues.  
These issues are beyond the scope of this comment and cannot be dealt with 
fully.  For further discussion on creation of a PIC, including examples of actual 
savings a PIC can provide, see generally Ira H. Rosen, Use of a Delaware 
Holding Company to Save State Income Taxes, 3-89 TAX ADVISER 180 (1989); 
George T. Bell et al., A State Tax Strategy for Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK 
REP. 445 (1991). 
 72. Chestek, supra note 71, at 1. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 8. 
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(Michigan), or does not have corporate taxes at all (Nevada), 
the parent essentially shifts its income into a tax free state.76  
Since payments made to the PICs are tax deductible business 
expenses, it appears as if the parent made little or no profit, 
and thus is assessed only minimal state tax.77  In reality, the 
payment to the PIC is simply passed through the PIC and 
returned to the parent corporation in the form of a dividend 
payment or as a loan from the subsidiary to the parent, dodging 
all state taxation.78  The net effect is tax free income, or as one 
court put it, “nowhere income.”79 
With direct taxation of PICs in question, some states have 
looked to alternate methods of taxing PICs.  There are several 
ways do this.  For example, Alabama, Connecticut, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, and Ohio have disallowed deductions for 
payments made to PICs under license agreements.80  This 
essentially keeps the income within the state where it can be 
subjected to taxation.81  While this method eliminates the tax 
loophole, it is far from perfect.  Since this method essentially 
allows two states to tax the same income, it may violate the fair 
apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test.  In essence, two 
states could make claims over the same money, thereby 
subjecting the PIC income to a threat of double taxation.82 
A second method for states to recover lost revenue is to use 
a combined reporting system, often known as the “unitary 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 6-7. 
 77. Id. at 7. 
 78. See Chestek, supra note 71, at 7; Bell, supra note 71, at 456.  By 
transferring the licensing fee back to the parent through a loan, the parent’s 
potential taxable equity is not increased and the parent may be able to obtain 
an interest deduction, further reducing its state tax burden.  Id.  
 79. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15 n.1 (S.C. 1993). 
 80. Tun-Jen Chiang, Comment, State Taxation of Out-of-State Trademark 
Holding Companies, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1547 (2003). 
 81. By not allowing the deduction, any payment that would convert profit 
into a royalty is still considered a profit on tax returns. 
 82. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1547; see Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S., 274, 279 (1977).  For example, if Lanco had been located in 
New Jersey instead of Delaware, it would be physically present and thus 
subject to the Corporate Business Tax.  Under this hypothetical, say that Lane 
Bryant’s payment to Lanco was $100.  By refusing the deduction, Lane Bryant 
must pay the disallowing state $100 of income worth in tax.  At the same time, 
Lanco would also be forced to pay the New Jersey tax on the $100 of royalty 
income.  Thus, the same $100 is subjected to double the income tax as it would 
have been were it never transferred, even though it really has only been 
“earned” once. 
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business principle.”83  This method, currently used by sixteen 
states, levies a tax on a pro rata share of all the income of a 
corporation and its subsidiaries based on a three factor 
apportionment formula.84  The formula is based in equal parts 
on the proportion of a unitary business’s total payroll, property, 
and sales which are located within the taxing state.85  Since the 
overwhelming amount of the total unitary business’s payroll, 
property, and sales occur in a taxing state, the taxing state 
effectively captures the income of the PIC.86  In addition to 
being held constitutional by the Supreme Court,87 the unitary 
business principle removes tax incentives to shift income 
within the corporate structure, yet allows such transfers where 
they result in other types of economic benefit.88  For this 
reason, this method is generally favored by academics.89  While 
the unitary business principle appears superior, moving to this 
system requires wholesale changes to a state’s revenue code, 
which comes with a high price, making it impracticable for 
some states.90 
A final method is to view the PIC as a “phantom entity” or 
a “sham corporation.”91  This determination is based on 
whether the subsidiary “lacked economic substance.”92  Once 
this label is applied, the state treats the PIC as another office 
or branch of the corporation, and attributes the PIC’s income to 
the already physically present corporation.93  For example, in 
                                                 
 83. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1550-52. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 
(1983). 
 86. Again, assume that Lane Bryant had made a $100 payment to Lanco.  
Since Lanco has only a negligible level of payroll, property, or sales, only a 
negligible amount of the Lanco/Lane Bryant family’s income is attributed to it 
and subject to taxation by the PIC’s home state.  The remainder of the income 
remains with Lane Bryant, where it will be subject to state taxation.  In 
essence, since the apportionment factors are based on external factors, shifting 
money from one branch to another does not affect state taxation levels. 
 87. See Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 183-85. 
 88. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1552. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Ashley B. Howard, Comment, Does the Internal Revenue Code Provide 
a Solution to a Common State Taxation Problem?: Proposing State Adoption of 
§ 367(D) to Tax Intangibles Holding Subsidiaries, 53 EMORY L.J. 561, 579 
(2004). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
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Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc.,94 the court found that 
two PICs, SYL, Inc. and Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. 
each lacked sufficient substance to be recognized as separate 
entities.95  Both PICs were Delaware corporations and utilized 
a “nexus service” in Delaware to manage their businesses.  
Neither entity had more than $1,200 in total payroll per year, 
and neither incurred virtually any expenses.96  However, this 
method of reaching PICs is unreliable—many PICs are not 
shams.  As discussed above, PICs may provide a number of 
legitimate benefits in addition to their use as a tax loophole.  
Furthermore, this does not solve the problem as forcing the PIC 
creators to provide the needed economic substance does little 
more than increase the cost of operating the shelter.97  As long 
as the tax savings outweigh the costs of providing the necessary 
economic substance, companies will still have an incentive to 
use PICs, providing little help to revenue starved states.98 
                                                 
 94. 825 A.2d 399 (Md. 2003). 
 95. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 825 A.2d at 415. 
 96. See id. at 402.  A “nexus service” is a company which specializes in 
providing office management services in Delaware.  For example, Registered 
Agents Legal Services, LLC provides a wide range of services for the creation 
of a Delaware Holding Company.  See Registered Agent Legal Services, LLC, 
Incorporation Improves Your Bottom Line, available at 
http://www.inclegal.com/how2improve.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). 
 97. See Bell, supra note 71, at 449-50.  According to Bell, to avoid being 
considered a sham corporation, the parent should follow a number of 
guidelines when forming and operating a PIC.  This includes maintaining an 
office in the PIC’s state, producing stationary or business cards, setting up a 
home banking account, maintaining a physical presence in the PIC’s state 
(such as office furniture, equipment, etc.), and holding meetings in the PIC’s 
state.  Id.  This does not change the essential feature of the PIC, but merely 
adds to the transactional costs of forming and operating one.  While this 
increased cost may cause some businesses to find a PIC inefficient, this hardly 
solves the problem of dealing with large companies such as The Limited, Inc. 
 98. For example, assume a sham PIC costs $1,000 per year to maintain, 
but a PIC with economic substance costs $5,000.  The “sham entity” view 
simply means that the company paying between $1,000 and $5,000 in state 
taxation will no longer find a PIC economically feasible.  Companies saving 
over $5,000 per year in state taxation will still find the system useful and 
would continue to operate the PIC.  For a company such as Lanco, which was 
able to save The Limited, Inc. hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxation in 
one state alone, the “sham entity” doctrine poses little threat.  See Secretary of 
Revenue v. A&F Trademark, Inc., Admin. Decision No. 381 at 26-27 (N.C. Tax 
Review Bd. May 7 2002), available at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/ 
practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 
2005); cf. Rosen, supra note 71, at 180 (providing an analysis of the potential 
tax savings by using a PIC, including a simple breakdown of operational 
expenses). 
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E.  GEOFFREY, INC. V. SOUTH CAROLINA – HOW SOUTH CAROLINA 
STUCK ITS NECK OUT AND CAPTURED THE GIRAFFE 
Faced with dramatically declining revenues, states have 
attempted to either recapture the PIC payments and subject 
them to taxation, or have attempted to tax the PICs directly. 99  
PICs and their parent companies have fought back, claiming 
the state methods violate the constitutional restrictions on 
state taxing power.  The first of these cases, Geoffrey, Inc. v. 
South Carolina Tax Commission,100 was brought in 1993, just a 
year after Quill was decided.101  Geoffrey, Inc., a PIC utilized 
by Toys R Us, held several valuable trademarks and trade 
names, including the name Toys R Us, Inc., which it then 
licensed back to Toys R Us for use in its retail stores.102  As a 
part of the agreement, Toys R Us paid Geoffrey one percent of 
the net sales of the licensed material.103  Originally, the South 
Carolina Tax Commission disallowed Toys R Us’s deduction of 
royalty payments made to Geoffrey, but it later rescinded on 
this position and instead directly assessed Geoffrey with its 
state business income tax based on the royalties received for 
use of Geoffrey’s intellectual property in the South Carolina 
Toys R Us stores.104  Geoffrey paid under protest and brought a 
claim for a refund of the taxes, asserting that it did not have 
the requisite substantial nexus with South Carolina.105 
In accordance with Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,106 the 
Geoffrey court separated the due process concerns from the 
Dormant Commerce Clause requirement of a “substantial 
nexus.”  The court began by analyzing Geoffrey’s claim that the 
Commission failed to satisfy the due process requirements.107  
Based on Geoffrey’s contacts with South Carolina, the Geoffrey 
court found that it had.108  In addition to the licensed 
                                                 
 99. See John A. Swain, State Income Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and 
Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321 n.1 (2003). 
 100.  437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 101. Geoffrey v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 102. Id. at 15. 
 103. Id.  This method enabled Geoffrey, who had no full-time employees, to 
generate approximately $55 million in income, all free of state taxation.  Id. at 
15 n.1. 
 104. Id. at 15. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  
 107. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16. 
 108. Id. 
OLSON_4_24_2005 7/11/2006  6:47:00 PM 
2005] LANCO, INC 117 
 
intellectual property the court found Geoffrey also possessed a 
franchise and accounts receivable in South Carolina.109  
According to the court, while there were no Toys R Us stores in 
South Carolina at the time it created its licensing agreement, 
Geoffrey had purposely availed itself in South Carolina since it 
was not brought into South Carolina unwillingly, nor did it 
prohibit the use of the intangibles in the state.110  While not 
required for due process, the court also found that the 
“presence of Geoffrey’s intangible property” provided an 
additional contact.111  Geoffrey had challenged this point, 
arguing that the situs of its intangibles was its corporate 
headquarters in Delaware, not in South Carolina.  The court 
rejected this contention, citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner 
of Taxes of Vermont112 for the proposition that intangible 
property may have a situs in more than one jurisdiction, and 
thus could exist in both Delaware and South Carolina.113  
Finding that Geoffrey possessed intangible property in and 
purposefully directed its activity at South Carolina, the court 
                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  The court stated:  
Geoffrey argues that the [Tax] Commission has failed to satisfy [due 
process] requirements.  We disagree.  The nexus requirement of the 
Due Process Clause can be satisfied even where the corporation has 
no physical presence in the taxing state if the corporation has 
purposely directed its activity at the state’s forum. 
Id. 
 111. Id.  “In addition to our finding that Geoffrey purposely directed its 
activities toward South Carolina, we find that the “minimum connection” 
required by due process also is satisfied by the presence of Geoffrey’s 
intangible property in this State.”  Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16. 
 112. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).  The case involved a question of whether Vermont 
could consider income Mobil Oil received in the form of dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries which were paid in New York.  The Supreme Court determined 
that “[a]lthough a fictionalized situs for intangible property sometimes has 
been invoked to avoid multiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing 
talismanic about the concepts of ‘business situs’ or ‘commercial domicile’ that 
automatically renders those concepts applicable when taxation of income from 
intangibles is at issue.”  Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 
425, 445 (1980).  The Supreme Court also stated:  
The Court also has recognized that the reason for a single place of 
taxation no longer obtains when the taxpayer’s activities with respect 
to the intangible property involve relations with more than one 
jurisdiction.  Even for property or franchise taxes, apportionment of 
values is not unknown.  Moreover, cases upholding allocation to a 
single situs for property tax purposes have distinguished income tax 
situations where the apportionment principle prevails. 
Id. (citations and internal quotes omitted). 
 113. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16-18. 
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held that Geoffrey could be taxed without violating the Due 
Process Clause.114 
The court then moved to the Commerce Clause portion of 
its analysis.115  Geoffrey argued that it did not have the 
requisite substantial nexus with South Carolina since it was 
not physically present within the state, relying on the 
Commerce Clause portion of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois116 and Quill.  The court found 
that reliance on Bellas Hess and Quill was “misplaced” since 
the physical presence requirement was limited to sales and use 
taxes only.117  Justifying its conclusion in part on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin 
Department of Taxation,118 the court found that “[t]he presence 
of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.”119  
Thus the only remaining question was whether this nexus was 
“substantial.”  The court did not articulate the ultimate value of 
Geoffrey’s activities in South Carolina, but concluded that “by 
licensing intangibles for use in [South Carolina] and deriving 
income from their use [there], Geoffrey [had] a ‘substantial 
nexus’ with [the state].”120 
Thus, Geoffrey represents two important points, both of 
which were rejected by the Lanco court.  First, the physical 
presence requirement set forth in Bellas Hess is limited to sales 
and use taxes only.121  Second, Geoffrey states that property 
need not be tangible in order to be considered present in the 
                                                 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 18. 
 116.  386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 117. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18. 
 118. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).  International Harvester involved a challenge to a 
Wisconsin tax on dividends distributed by corporations doing business in 
Wisconsin, which included International Harvester.  Id. at 438.  The 
stockholders challenged the tax on due process grounds, as they had no 
physical connection with the state.  Id. at 439-40.  The Supreme Court rejected 
the challenge on the basis that the stockholders had received benefits from the 
state, even though they had no physical presence in the state.  Id. at 441-43.  
 119. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18 (citing International Harvester Co. v. 
Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944); Dairy Queen Corp. v. 
Taxation and Revenue Dep’t, 605 P.2d 251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (involving 
taxation of franchise agreements)). 
 120. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.  
 121. Id.  “It is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, 
physical presence in a state for income to be taxable there.  The presence of 
intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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state, and thus create nexus.122  While Geoffrey, Inc. filed for a 
Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court, this writ was 
rejected, and the Supreme Court let the decision stand.123 
F.  STICKING ITS NECK OUT THERE: STATES CONSIDER WHETHER 
GEOFFREY WAS THE CORRECT DECISION 
Geoffrey has received mixed reviews.  Some commentators 
attacked it as a renegade decision or out of line with Quill.124  
For example, one commentator questioned whether Geoffrey’s 
position on the location of intangibles was necessary, and 
argued that the decision should be questioned for both purpose 
and accuracy, ultimately concluding that the court “directly 
contravened the intent of the Supreme Court” by not requiring 
a physical presence for income tax purposes.125  Other 
commentators have rejected the arguments put forth by 
Geoffrey’s critics.126  For example, one article claimed the 
criticisms were directed at Geoffrey “in essence for not paying 
lip service to the notion of physical presence,” even though it 
could have easily done so without impacting the crux of its 
analysis.127 
Courts have also treated Geoffrey with inconsistent and 
                                                 
 122. Id. at 17.  
 
 123. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue and Taxation, 510 U.S. 992 
(1993).  Of course, it should be noted that denial of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari imparts no implication or inference on the Court’s views of the 
merits of a case.  Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 
365 (1973); cf. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1985). 
 124. Swain, supra note 99, at 359 (noting that many commentators 
attacked Geoffrey); see also Douglas Poms, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax 
Commission: South Carolina Sticks its Neck Out and Taxes Delaware Holding 
Company, 13 VA. TAX REV. 771 (1994); Mark A. McGinnis, Marching to the 
Beat of the Itinerant Drummer: States Increasingly Refuse to Get Physical 
before Finding Nexus, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 149, 175-78 (2003). 
 125. Douglas Poms, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission: 
South Carolina sticks its Neck out and Taxes Delaware Holding Company, 13 
VA. TAX REV. 771, 779-80 (1994). 
 126. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional 
Nexus, Intangible Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 407, 441-47 (1994) (stating that Geoffrey relied on a doctrine that dates 
back almost one hundred years and has gained state reliance); see also John A. 
Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy 
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, supra note 99, at 358-62 (2003) 
(agreeing with Geoffrey’s outcome, but noting that states are timid to 
implement it). 
 127. Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical “Physical 
Presence” Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105, 137 (2000). 
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mixed results.  For example, in Couchot v. State Lottery 
Commission,128 the court cited Geoffrey for support in its 
decision to reject a physical presence requirement on taxation 
of lottery winnings,129 and in GMC v. City of Seattle,130 the 
court used Geoffrey to reject a physical presence requirement 
for a business and occupation tax.131  The clearest example of 
Geoffrey’s acceptance comes out of North Carolina, in A & F 
Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson.132  Tolson is identical to Lanco, 
except that North Carolina sought to include the other 
members of The Limited, Inc. family as well.133  Just as in 
Lanco and Geoffrey, the taxpayers challenged the authority of 
North Carolina to assess them with a tax without a showing of 
physical presence.134  Ultimately, the Tolson court decided to 
follow Geoffrey and assess the PICs with state taxes.  Of course, 
this put North Carolina directly at odds with the decision in 
Lanco.135  Instead of just dismissing Lanco as non-controlling, 
the court analyzed Lanco’s justifications, disagreeing with each 
of them.136 
Other courts have either explicitly or implicitly rejected 
Geoffrey, requiring a physical presence of tangible property no 
matter what type of tax is being applied.137  An argument has 
been put forth that Geoffrey’s cool reception may not indicate 
                                                 
 128. 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996).    
 129. Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n, 659 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ohio 1996).  
It should be noted that the court nevertheless found that physical presence 
would nonetheless exist in the case.  Id.  This statement, however, is dicta and 
does not impact the cases proposition. 
 130.  25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. App. 2001). 
 131. GMC v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash. App. 2001); see, 
e.g., Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. 2000) 
(interest in partnership creates substantial nexus).  
 132. 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 133. See A & F Trademark v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004).  In fact, Lanco, Inc. was one of the named parties to the case.  Id.  Just 
as in Lanco, North Carolina sought to tax the PICs with its version of the state 
franchise tax.  Id. 
 134. See id. at 193. 
 135. Id. at 196. 
 136. See id. at 195-96. 
 137. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 654 N.E.2d 954, 
960-61 (N.Y. 1995); Scholastic Book Clubs v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d 
692, 694 (Mich. App. 1997); Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp. 18 S.W.3d 
296, 300-01 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding licensing agreement insufficient to 
create substantial nexus as it was not physically present); Cerro Copper 
Prods., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, No. F-94-444, 1995 Ala. Tax LEXIS 211, 
at *4-6 (Admin. Law Div. Dec. 11, 1995). 
OLSON_4_24_2005 7/11/2006  6:47:00 PM 
2005] LANCO, INC 121 
 
its weakness, but may have resulted from uncertain readings of 
Quill, taxpayer willingness to litigate the issue, and timid 
taxing authorities who are unwilling to test the limits of 
Quill.138  Judging from the number of decisions which have 
refused to require a physical presence, yet find physical 
presence in dicta, this may be an accurate reading.139 
III.  LANCO, INC.–PHYSICAL OR NOT?  PRESENT OR NOT?  
NEW JERSEY TAXES, PICS AND PHYSICAL PRESENCE 
In the middle of this morass of changing doctrines, 
conflicting cases and divergent analysis, Lanco, Inc. challenged 
New Jersey’s ability to assess it, and other similarly situation 
PICs, with the New Jersey Corporate Business Tax.  Lanco, 
Inc., the PIC affiliated with Lane Bryant, a national clothing 
retailer and a part of The Limited, Inc. family of corporations, 
licensed various forms of intellectual property to Lane 
Bryant.140  Lanco did not have any offices, employees, real or 
tangible property in New Jersey; however, it held the rights to 
intangible property in the form of trademarks, trade names, 
and service marks which it licensed to Lane Bryant for use in 
                                                 
 138. John A. Swain, supra note 99, at 361. 
 139. See, e.g., GMC v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash. App. 
2001); Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n., 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996) 
(refusing to extend physical presence requirement to lottery winnings; 
however, the court, in dicta, did state that physical presence would be met 
since the income relates to taxpayer’s presence in state at time of purchase of 
ticket); J.C. Penny Nat’l. Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 842 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1999) (while the court was careful not to require a physical presence, it did 
state that the Commissioner of Revenue cited no authority by the Supreme 
Court which had upheld a state tax where the taxpayer had no physical 
presence); Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n., Inc. v. Comm’r. of Revenue 746 
N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2001).  The court declined to extend a physical presence 
requirement to income taxes, yet based its decision to tax the Plaintiff on 
account of the physical presence of the trucks in the state, even though 
Plaintiff had no control over them.  See Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n., Inc., 
746 N.E.2d at 149-50.  The court did not mention the lease agreement when 
determining whether there was a substantial nexus.  See id. at 150. 
 140. Lanco v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 203 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
2003).  The Limited Inc. is primarily engaged in nationwide retail of Men’s, 
Women’s and Children’s clothing.  Secretary of Revenue v. A&F Trademark, 
Inc., Admin. Decision No. 381 at 4 (N.C. Tax Review Bd. May 7 2002), 
available at 
http://www.dor.state.nc.us/practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.
pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).  The Limited, Inc. has seven subsidiary 
clothing retailers.  Each of these has a corresponding PIC which is either a 
subsidiary of The Limited or a second generation subsidiary under Limco 
Investments, Inc.  See id. at 5.  These include the popular brands of 
Abercrombie and Fitch, Victoria’s Secret, Express and The Limited. 
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its New Jersey stores.141  In exchange for the use of Lanco’s 
intellectual property rights, Lane Bryant would pay royalties to 
Lanco.  Viewing the licensing agreement as a form of doing 
business in the state, the New Jersey Department of Revenue 
assessed Lanco with the Corporate Business Tax, the state’s 
business income tax.142  Lanco’s ultimate question therefore 
became: does a company whose sole connection with a state is a 
licensing agreement on intellectual property located within the 
state have a sufficient nexus with the state such that it may be 
subject to local income taxes? 
The Lanco court began by setting out the four part 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady143 test outlined above.144  
Focusing on the “substantial nexus” prong, the court opened 
with a lengthy discussion of Quill Corp v. North Dakota,145 its 
treatment of “substantial nexus” both in terms of Due Process 
and Commerce Clauses, and whether the physical presence 
requirement applied to all taxes or was limited to sales and use 
taxes.146  In particular, the court noted that Quill removed the 
physical presence requirement under due process, but not 
under the Commerce Clause.147  The court recognized the 
requirement relied a great deal on stare decisis; however, the 
court noted that Quill also analyzed the requirement on its own 
merits.148  This analysis was important since, 
[t]he decisive question in [Lanco] is whether the physical presence 
requirement confirmed in Quill under the Commerce Clause applies 
simply to the use tax collection obligation directly at issue in that 
case, or whether it is also a necessary element of substantial nexus 
for the imposition of a state income or franchise tax.149 
Materially indistinguishable from Geoffrey, Inc. v. South 
                                                 
 141. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 203. 
 142. Id.  The New Jersey Corporate Business Tax is a franchise tax for the 
privilege of doing business in New Jersey.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-1-41 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004).  Out of state corporations must apportion a share 
of its overall income to New Jersey.  Id.  The percentage that is assigned to 
New Jersey is derived using an equation which is based on the corporation’s 
value of property, sales and payroll which exist in New Jersey as compared to 
its total value.  Id.  
 143.  430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 144. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 204. 
 145.  504 U.S. 298 (1992).  
 146. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 204. 
 147. Id. at 204-05. 
 148. See id. at 206-07. 
 149. See id. at 207. 
OLSON_4_24_2005 7/11/2006  6:47:00 PM 
2005] LANCO, INC 123 
 
Carolina Tax Commission,150 the South Carolina Supreme 
Court had already answered this question by holding that the 
physical presence requirement set forth in National Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois151 and redefined 
in Quill did not apply to an income tax.152  The Lanco court 
could choose to follow South Carolina or venture on its own.  It 
chose the latter, finding the Geoffrey court’s decision “not 
persuasive.”153  The Lanco court cited three reasons for its 
disagreement: the lack of differences between the Corporate 
Business Tax, the use and sales taxes at issue in Quill and 
Bellas Hess, cases prior to Quill that suggested physical 
presence was required, and the lack of acceptance of Geoffrey 
by other states.154 
The court took the view that administrative difficulties 
encountered by a business forced to collect a sales and use tax, 
difficulties which concerned both the Quill and Bellas Hess 
courts, are equally present in administration of the income 
tax.155  As the court saw it, “[i]f physical presence is a 
constitutional necessity for one [type of tax], it is illogical that 
it should not be for both.”156  Additionally, the court found 
precedent prior to the Quill decision to be consistent with its 
position, although it did not cite cases in support of its position.  
Rather, the court cited a number of cases which appeared to 
forego a physical presence requirement, but found these cases 
to be inapplicable, pointing out that each involved a taxed 
entity that had some degree of tangible physical presence in the 
taxing state.157  The court then used Geoffrey’s lack of broad 
acceptance as another justification for it to reject Geoffrey’s 
reasoning.158  As it had done with the pre-Quill cases, the court 
did not cite a case supporting its position, choosing instead to 
distinguish those cases which followed Geoffrey’s rejection of a 
                                                 
 150.  437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 151. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 152. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15-18 (S.C. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 153. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 207. 
 154. Id. at 208.  
  
 155. Id. at209.  
  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 211-12. 
 158. Id. at 213-14. 
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physical presence requirement.159  With each, the court found 
them inapplicable since each taxpayer had at least some level 
of physical presence in the taxing state.160 
From the outset, the parties had stipulated that Lanco did 
not have a physical presence of tangible property in New 
Jersey.161  Thus, the conclusion that Bellas Hess and Quill 
mandated a physical presence before an entity could be taxed 
in compliance with the Commerce Clause was a dispositive one.  
Because New Jersey was unable to show that Lanco had the 
necessary physical contacts with the state, the court held that 
constitutional restraints prevented New Jersey from assessing 
Lanco with the Corporate Business Tax.  This allowed Lane 
Bryant and The Limited corporate family to continue to use the 
PIC loophole to avoid taxation in New Jersey. 
IV.  THERE’S NO NEED TO GET PHYSICAL–LANCO, INC. 
INCORRECTLY APPLIES A PHYSICAL PRESENCE 
REQUIREMENT TO INCOME TAXES 
The decisive question for the Lanco court was whether the 
physical presence requirement of “substantial nexus” under the 
Commerce Clause applied to income taxes.  Geoffrey, Inc. v. 
South Carolina Tax Commission,162 the only case directly on 
point, held that it did not; whereas, Lanco found Geoffrey to be 
unpersuasive and held that the physical requirement did apply.  
A deeper look at Lanco’s arguments actually demonstrates that 
Geoffrey’s holding is correct and Lanco was incorrectly decided. 
A.  BURDENS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND DIFFERENTIATING 
THE TAXES 
In deciding whether to extend Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota’s163 physical presence requirement to income taxes, the 
Lanco court found no reason to distinguish between income and 
sales taxes.164  In reality, there are a number of reasons to 
distinguish between the two forms of tax.  First, there are 
differences in administrative burdens.  For any multi-
jurisdictional business, the sheer number of possible taxes can 
                                                 
 159. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213-14. 
 160. Id. at 212-14.  
  
 161. Id. at 203. 
 162.  437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 163.  504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992). 
 164. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 209. 
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be onerous.  Recognizing this fact, both Quill and Bellas Hess 
discussed concerns about mail order carriers being subject to 
more than six thousand taxing jurisdictions,165 the “many 
variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions and in 
administrative and record-keeping requirements,”166 which 
could create “a welter of complicated obligations.”167  By its 
very nature, the burden multiple taxing jurisdictions create 
falls harder on interstate businesses, which conduct activities 
in several jurisdictions and may be forced to complete returns 
for each of those jurisdictions.  When revisiting the point in 
Quill, the Court stated that imposing the duty to collect a sales 
or use tax such as the one suggested by North Dakota, which 
required a vendor to collect the tax if it made as few as three 
advertisements in the state, might unduly burden interstate 
commerce.168  Justice White, on the other hand, rejected the 
excessive burden argument.  According to Justice White, with 
modern technology, filing in each of these six thousand 
jurisdictions, both at the state and local levels, may only 
impose nominal expenses.169 
Either way, the concern for administrative burden is not as 
prevalent with regard to income taxes.  Compared to sales and 
use taxes, relatively few jurisdictions charge an income tax.170  
If the expense of monitoring six thousand jurisdictions charging 
a sales and use tax is nominal, as suggested by Justice White, 
then the expense of monitoring activity in jurisdictions with 
income taxes is only a fraction of nominal.171  Thus, if 
protecting against unnecessary burdens is a goal, income taxes 
                                                 
 165. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6; National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60. 
 166. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60. 
 167. Id. at 760. 
 168. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.  It should be noted that the Court did 
not say that such a tax would “necessarily” pose an excessive burden on the 
vendor.  Furthermore, it could well be argued that the North Dakota tax 
would violate the “substantial” portion of the nexus test.  While courts have 
found a nexus on thin strands of nexus, simply sending three advertisements 
into the state appears to be excessively low.  Thus it may well be that the 
burdens caused in relation to the incredibly insubstantial nexus would make 
such the North Dakota tax suspect. 
 169. See id. at 332 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1545. 
 171. Again, adherence to the requirement of a substantial nexus would 
help eliminate this concern.  By requiring the taxpayer have a substantial 
nexus with a state, any potential administrative burden, which according to 
Justice White is nominal at best, can be spread across the larger number of 
connections to the state.  This makes administrative burdens even less of a 
concern for both sales and income taxes. 
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need less scrutiny than sales and use taxes. 
There are other reasons to differentiate between sales and 
use taxes and income taxes.  For example, an economic theory 
known as “forwardshifting” suggests that sales and use taxes 
may be more disruptive to the national economy.172  Assuming 
a seller operates on a profit-maximizing strategy, a tax on 
income will not affect the price or quantity of goods supplied 
since a change in either will reduce taxable income and thus 
reduce the seller’s profits.173  A sales or use tax, however, 
increases the ultimate price to the consumer, the individual 
who ultimately bears the tax burden.174  Since the sales tax is 
based on total revenues and not net profits, it is possible to 
reduce the ultimate tax burden by simply selling fewer units, 
thereby reducing overall revenues.175  If the combination of cost 
savings, including taxes, is greater than the lost profit, it is 
economically rational for sellers to limit sales.176  In essence, 
some of the seller’s tax burden can be “forwardshifted” to the 
consumer.177  This may result in lowered overall sales, thereby 
reducing the overall level of interstate commerce.178  Since the 
Commerce Clause, which guides the substantial nexus 
requirement, is concerned with the effect of state and local 
action on the national economy, “forwardshifting” should 
subject sales taxes to greater scrutiny than income taxes.179  As 
a result, sales and use taxes should be subject to greater 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause than income taxes. 
Furthermore, requiring a physical presence for income 
taxes potentially exempts entire industries from state 
                                                 
 172. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1540. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1541.  
  
 178. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1542.  
  
 179. But see id.  Chiang concludes that this economic theory actually runs 
against Geoffrey since “one goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to ensure 
that each state taxes only its ‘fair share’ of interstate commerce.”  He argues 
that a physical presence requirement is needed since income taxes do not 
allow companies to shift the burden back to the state’s citizens, and thus allow 
states to place an unfair burden on out-of-state companies.  While it may be 
true that income taxes place a greater burden on out-of-state sellers, this is an 
issue for the discrimination prong of the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. test, not 
the nexus requirement. 
OLSON_4_24_2005 7/11/2006  6:47:00 PM 
2005] LANCO, INC 127 
 
taxation.180  Quill and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department 
of Revenue of Illinois181 carved out a “discrete realm of 
commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation.”182  By 
using PICs to shift income to non-taxing states, companies are 
able to avoid paying for state provided protections.  “It was not 
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in 
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden 
even though it increases the cost of doing business.”183  It is this 
threat of allowing businesses to avoid all state taxation that 
makes a blanket physical presence requirement “potentially 
dangerous.”184 
The Lanco court’s proposition that “[i]f physical presence is 
a constitutional necessity for one [type of tax], it is illogical that 
it should not be for both”185 does not stand up to scrutiny.  
Sales and use taxes and income taxes are functionally different 
and ultimately have different effects on taxed entities.  Simply 
put, income taxes carry fewer administrative burdens for the 
taxpayer and pose less of a threat to interstate commerce.  
Unlike a sales or use tax, which is paid by every consumer, 
creative tax planners can exempt entire industries from income 
taxation.  Accordingly, it is illogical for a court to apply the 
same analysis to the constitutionality of income taxes as it does 
to sales and use taxes. 
B.  PRIOR PRECEDENT AND PHYSICAL PRESENCE 
Quill did not state whether the physical presence 
requirement should be extended to income taxes.  However, the 
Lanco court found that “[t]he conclusion that physical presence 
is necessary to support state taxation of income is fully 
consistent with and strongly suggested by the Commerce 
Clause cases decided before Quill.”186  Analysis of these prior 
cases reveals the opposite. 
The Supreme Court has in fact applied a tax without 
finding physical presence on more than one occasion.  For 
                                                 
 180. See Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical 
“Physical Presence” Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105, 110 (2000). 
 181.  386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 182. See Quill, 580 U.S. at 314. 
 183. W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938). 
 184. Fatale, supra note 180, at 110. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 209 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
2003). 
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example, in Whitney v. Graves,187 the Court upheld New York’s 
tax on the sale of an intangible right, even though the taxed 
person had no physical presence in the state.188  In Whitney, a 
Massachusetts company was a member of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).189  When the NYSE expanded its 
membership, the Massachusetts company was entitled to a 
portion of the new membership, which the Massachusetts 
company sold.190  New York tried to tax the sale and the 
company fought.191  The Lanco court found the use of this case 
unpersuasive because, “Whitney is also a due process case, in 
which New York was found to have jurisdiction to tax a 
Massachusetts resident on income from the sale of a right 
derived from a sale on the [NYSE].”192  Contrary to this 
assertion, nowhere did the Supreme Court discuss due process 
restrictions on a state’s taxing power.  Instead, the Court 
focused on whether the Massachusetts company had created a 
“business situs” in New York, which would then give New York 
the authority to subject it to state taxation.193  As the Court 
stated, 
When we speak of a “business situs” of intangible property in the 
taxing State we are indulging in a metaphor.  We express the idea of 
localization by virtue of the attributes of the intangible right in 
relation to the conduct of affairs at a particular place.  The right may 
grow out of the actual transactions of a localized business or the right 
may be identified with a particular place because the exercise of the 
right is fixed exclusively or dominantly at that place . . . .  We think 
that the dominant attribute of relator’s membership in the New York 
Stock Exchange so links it to the situs of the Exchange as to localize it 
at that place and hence to bring it within the taxing power of New 
York.  Accordingly we hold that in laying the tax upon the profits 
derived by the relator from the sale of the right appurtenant to his 
membership the State did not exceed the bounds of its jurisdiction.194 
Thus, Whitney is not a due process case and it closely 
                                                 
 187.  299 U.S. 366 (1937). 
 188. See Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366, 372-74 (1937). 
 189. Id. at 369. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 210.  Note that even if Whitney was a due 
process case, it should still guide modern Commerce Clause nexus 
requirements.  As discussed earlier, the substantial nexus requirement was 
originally conceived of as a due process test.  It was not until Quill that the 
substantial nexus test was placed under a Commerce Clause analysis.  
Whitney’s physical presence “nexus” requirement was read under the Due 
Process Clause, as were all other physical presence cases. 
 193. Whitney, 299 U.S. at 372-73 
 194. Id. at 372. 
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resembles Lanco.  In both cases, an entity possessing an 
intangible right in another state sells or licenses the property 
to another for a fee.  The state then uses that fee as a basis for 
determining the applicable state tax due.  Whitney found that 
such a tax was within New York’s power; Lanco found that 
New Jersey did not have that same right. 
The Lanco court also cited International Harvester Co. v. 
Wisconsin Department of Taxation.195  In International 
Harvester Co., the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin’s tax on 
derivatives paid out by a Wisconsin corporation was 
substantial, even though the vast majority of the shareholders 
had no physical presence in the state.196  The Geoffrey court 
cited this case to support the proposition that a state may tax 
the income of a non-resident that is fairly attributed either to 
property in the state or to events or transactions which receive 
protections from the state.197  Lanco disagreed with 
Geoffrey’s198 reading and saw International Harvester Co. as a 
tax on the corporation.199  Contrary to the suggested reading in 
Lanco, the tax did not come out of the corporation’s general 
fund; it came out of the pockets of the shareholders.  Therefore, 
the tax would not have been assessed had the derivative not 
been paid.200  The burden did not fall on the corporation; it fell 
on the shareholders.201  To call the tax at issue in International 
Harvester Co. a tax on the corporation would be analogous to 
calling the income taxes taken from an employee’s paycheck a 
tax on their employer, not the employee, a proposition that 
would likely not find support from America’s workforce.  Thus, 
International Harvester Co. demonstrated that source and 
benefits, not physical presence, are the hallmark of the 
requisite Commerce Clause nexus.202 
C.  STATE COURT ADOPTION OF GEOFFREY 
Lanco’s final justification for not following Geoffrey, Inc. v. 
                                                 
 195. 322 U.S. 435(1944).  
 196. International Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 
441-42 (1944). 
 197. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993). 
 198.  437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 199. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 211 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003).  
 200. See International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 439. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Swain, supra note 99, at 349-51. 
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South Carolina Tax Commission203 was the failure by state 
courts to adopt its analysis.204  Despite the lack of 
overwhelming acceptance, Geoffrey has not been outright 
rejected.  In fact, a number of courts have followed Geoffrey’s 
lead in finding the physical presence requirement inapplicable 
to income taxes.205  In fact, three of the cases cited by Lanco as 
physical presence cases, Truck Renting & Leasing Association 
v. Commissioner of Revenue,206 Couchot v. State Lottery 
Commission,207 and General Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle,208 
are silent on the issue of physical presence, or actually held 
that physical presence is not required. 209 
First, in Truck Renting & Leasing, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court held that a business with leased trucks 
entering Massachusetts was subject to income taxes, even if the 
lessor did not own or maintain a place of business in 
Massachusetts.210  Like Lanco, the taxpayer protested the tax 
in part on its lack of physical presence in Massachusetts.211  In 
its discussion of the Commerce Clause restrictions, the Truck 
Renting & Leasing court neither adopted nor declined a 
physical presence requirement, noting that neither party has 
argued that such a test would apply.212  This is no more a 
rejection of Geoffrey as it is an adoption of its reasoning and 
offers little support for Lanco. 
In analyzing the next cases cited in its decision, Couchot 
and General Motors Corp., the Lanco court relied on dicta it 
found in the cases to support its position.  The Lanco court used 
Couchot as support for the physical presence requirement.  
                                                 
 203.  437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
 204. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213. 
 205. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 206. 746 N.E. 2d 143 (Mass. 2001). 
 207. 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996). 
 208. 25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. App. 2001), review denied, 84 P.3d 1230 (Wash. 
2004), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002). 
 209. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213. 
 210. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 746 N.E.2d 
143, 150 (Mass. 2001). 
 211. Id. at 146. 
 212. Id. at 149 n.13.  The court stated:  
In [Quill], the Court upheld a “physical-presence requirement” before 
a State, consistent with the commerce clause, could subject an out-of-
State vendor to a use or sales tax.  The court did not extend this rule 
to other types of taxes.  Neither party has argued that such a 
requirement would apply to the tax at issue here. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Couchot involved a challenge to Ohio’s taxation of lottery 
winnings by a recipient who had no physical presence in 
Ohio.213  The court specifically held that physical presence was 
not a requisite for income taxes.214  However, in dicta, the court 
conceded that had physical presence been required, by entering 
the state to purchase the lottery ticket, the recipient of the 
winnings would have had the requisite physical presence in 
Ohio.215  The Lanco court looked past the conditional language 
and used the dicta of Couchot as evidence of the physical 
presence requirement.  Couchot’s holding runs right up against 
the Lanco decision, not with it. 
Much the same could be said for General Motors Corp.  In 
General Motors Corp., the court adopted Geoffrey’s market 
exploitation criteria instead of requiring physical presence.216  
The General Motors Corp. court declined to extend Quill Corp. 
v. North Dakota’s217 requirement to the tax at issue.218  As it 
had in Couchot, the court again looked past the General Motors 
Corp. holding, and asserted that the General Motors could be 
subject to taxation since, “[i]t is clear . . . that the automobile 
manufacturers had a physical presence in the taxing 
jurisdiction.”219 Thus, the court appeared to be less concerned 
with the holding than with the facts surrounding the case. 
In order to support its contention that states have rejected 
Geoffrey, Lanco relied on one case that is neutral on the issue 
and two whose holdings were consistent with Geoffrey.  If 
following the direction of other state courts is one of the 
justifications for adopting or rejecting a physical presence 
requirement, the Lanco court should have actually ruled 
differently. 
                                                 
 213. See Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n, 659 N.E.2d 1225, 1227, 1229 
(Ohio 1996). 
 214. Id. at 1230. 
 215. See id.; Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 213 (N.J. 
Tax Ct. 2003).  Note that the Ohio court in Couchot did not talk about whether 
entering the jurisdiction to purchase a single time would be a “substantial” 
nexus.  This further demonstrates that the physical presence was merely an 
afterthought and cannot be viewed as one of the Court’s holdings.  Couchot, 
659 N.E.2d at 1225. 
 216. General Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash. 
App. 2001), review denied 84 P.3d 1230 (2004), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 
(2002). 
 217.  504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992). 
 218. General Motors Corp., 25 P.3rd at 1029. 
 219. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213. 
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D.  CONCLUSION: LANCO INCORRECTLY GETS PHYSICAL AND 
ASSAULTS THE STATE’S COFFERS 
Lack of in-depth analysis, selective reading, and subtle 
twisting of precedent, caused the Lanco court to incorrectly 
apply a physical presence requirement for Commerce Clause 
nexus.  The potential burdens associated with the 
administration of sales and use taxes are not present with 
income taxes, or are only a fraction of nominal costs.  In 
exchange, the Lanco court requires a system that could exempt 
entire industries from state taxation and poses a greater threat 
to the national economy, which the Dormant Commerce Clause 
was intended to protect.  Contrary to Lanco’s contention, prior 
Supreme Court holdings actually demonstrated that a taxed 
entity does not need to be physically present in a tax 
jurisdiction.  State courts have not overwhelmingly adopted 
Geoffrey, but a small and growing number of states agree with 
its holding.220  The Lanco court’s position is ill-supported and 
untenable. 
V.  PHYSICAL PROPERTIES – WHY THE LANCO 
EXTENSION OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE STILL SHOULD 
NOT HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME 
A.  PHYSICAL PRESENCE V. NEXUS – AN INTERCHANGEABLE 
TERM USING INCOMPATIBLE WORDS 
The Lanco court viewed the decision to extend the physical 
presence requirement to income taxes as the determinative 
question.221  However, the court missed the mark.  Despite 
having incorrectly extended the test, a close look at Quill Corp. 
v. North Dakota’s222 articulation of a Commerce Clause nexus 
demonstrates that the court should have sided with New 
Jersey. 
Once it was determined that a physical presence was 
required, contrary to the Lanco court’s assertion, the truly 
determinative questions were whether or not Lanco had the 
requisite physical presence in New Jersey and, if so, whether 
this presence was “substantial.”  Beginning with whether 
presence existed, both parties agreed that Lanco’s only 
connection with New Jersey was through a licensing agreement 
                                                 
 220. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 221. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 207. 
 222. 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).  
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authorizing the use of its intellectual property by Lane 
Bryant.223  Accordingly, the court should have asked whether 
intellectual property can be “physically present” under the test.  
The Lanco court skipped this step and simply assumed that 
that it could not.224  Because  
[t]he decisive question in this case is whether the physical presence 
requirement confirmed in Quill under the Commerce Clause applies 
simply to the use tax collection obligation directly at issue in that 
case, or whether it is also a necessary element of substantial nexus 
for the imposition of a state income or franchise tax,225  
a closer look at Quill demonstrates that intellectual property 
can, in fact, be physically present. 
Under circumstances similar to Lanco’s licensure of 
intangible property in New Jersey, Quill possessed intangible 
property in North Dakota.  In addition to its physical products, 
Quill licensed a computer software program to its customers 
that enabled them to monitor Quill’s inventories.226  Quill 
retained ownership of the actual intellectual property,227 just as 
Lanco retained ownership of its intellectual property utilized by 
Lane Bryant.  In Quill, the Supreme Court found this situation 
established a nexus with North Dakota.228  This nexus, based 
on just a few floppy disks containing a computer program, 
according to the Court, amounted to nothing more than a de 
minimis nexus.229  The Supreme Court had previously rejected 
the use of a de minimis or “slightest presence” standard.230 
Under the Quill Court’s analysis, “physical presence” is a 
bit of misnomer, since the connection creating the nexus need 
not be physical at all.  In reality “physical presence” is a 
shorthand expression and description of “nexus.”  The problem 
with using “physical presence” to define the requisite “nexus” is 
that it is under-inclusive, as it suggests that intangible 
property, such as a computer program on a floppy disk, is not 
enough.  This sets a trap for unsuspecting courts, as happened 
                                                 
 223. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax 203.  The parties stipulated that Lanco did not 
have offices, employees or real or tangible property in New Jersey.  Id. 
 224. Id. at 207. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 n.1 (1992). 
 227. See id. 
 228. Id. at 315 n.8. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id; National. Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 
U.S. 551, 556 (1977) (rejecting the California Supreme Court’s assertion that 
“slightest presence” met the Commerce Clause nexus requirement). 
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in Lanco court. 
B.  “SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS” – AN IGNORED SUBSTANTIVE 
QUESTION 
The test is not just whether there is a nexus between the 
state and the taxpayer.  De minimis contacts are insufficient; in 
order to subject an entity to taxation, the nexus must be 
substantial.231  As discussed above, the licensing agreement 
with Lane Bryant, which was utilized by its New Jersey retail 
locations, created a nexus between Lanco and New Jersey.  The 
Lanco court should have analyzed separately whether the 
nexus was “substantial.”  Having fallen into the “physical 
presence” trap, the court never analyzed the question of 
whether the nexus that existed was substantial.  Nevertheless, 
it is a question which can be quickly solved.  While the court 
does not state the level of activity needed, this issue is not just 
about “the existence . . . of a few floppy diskettes.”232  Receiving 
royalties of 5.5% of Lane Bryant’s overall sales amounts to 
hundreds of thousands in IP rights.233  In terms of money or 
                                                 
 231. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8; D.H. Homes Co. v. McNamara, 
486 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1988) (finding a substantial nexus); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 
U.S. 252, 263 (1988) (doubting “that States through which the telephone call’s 
electronic signals merely pass have a sufficient nexus to tax that call”).  
Compare Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Was. Dept. of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 
562 (1975) (taxing of company who employed a single agent working out of his 
own home, even though he did not make any sales or take any orders 
constituted a substantial nexus); Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of 
N.Y., 654 N.E.2d 954, 954 (N.Y.1995) (agents entering New York to resolve 
problems give instructions regarding its products created a substantial nexus, 
even though the agents made no direct sales), with In re Appeal of Intercard, 
Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1112 (Kan. 2000) (eleven trips into Kansas by employees to 
install card reading units did not constitute a sufficient substantial nexus). 
 232. Id. at 313 n.8. 
 233. The number of stores located in New Jersey and their sales totals are 
relatively comparable.  This is based on a search of the number and sales 
figures for Lane Bryant stores in both states via Lexis-Nexis’s database of 
business records.  From 1992 to 1994, Lanco was assessed with over $300,000 
in franchise and income taxes in North Carolina.  See Secretary of Revenue v. 
A&F Trademark, Inc. et al., Admin. Decision No. 381 at 26-27 (N.C. Tax 
Review Bd. May 7 2002), available at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/ 
practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 
2005).  While North Carolina’s sales appear to be on average higher than New 
Jersey’s sales, but New Jersey’s tax is higher than North Carolina’s, which 
makes up for this difference.  Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.3 (2004) 
with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-5a(c)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).  While this 
is not perfect calculation, it does demonstrate that New Jersey was providing 
protections for hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars worth of 
Lanco’s intellectual property. 
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time spent in the state, this level of activity goes beyond the de 
minimis level.  It surpasses the level that various courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have found to be substantial.234 
The Lanco court seemingly added the word “tangible” to 
“physical presence,” a criteria which was never a part of the 
Quill analysis.235  As a result of this misreading, the Lanco 
court never addressed whether Lanco’s activities were 
“substantial.”  If Lanco’s activities in other states serve as a 
reliable benchmark, undoubtedly the Court would have 
concluded that the activity was substantial.  New Jersey could 
then rightfully subject Lanco to state taxation.  In the end, 
after having incorrectly required a physical presence for income 
taxes, the Lanco court required a presence of “tangible” 
property, even though this was never required by National 
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois236 or 
Quill.  In essence, the Lanco court had an opportunity to take 
an alternate route to the correct destination, but ultimately got 
lost in the quagmire of state tax precedent. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: LACK OF IN DEPTH ANALYSIS LEADS 
TO THE WRONG DECISION 
Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation237 represented 
an opportunity for New Jersey to determine whether a state 
could constitutionally tax an entity whose only connection with 
a state was through a licensing agreement.  By applying an 
incorrect reading of the relevant precedent, the Lanco court 
required a physical presence in order to subject a business to 
the New Jersey Corporate Business Tax.  Even with this error, 
the court should still have found sufficient contacts with the 
state to allow the tax to stand.  However, it failed to fully read 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,238 and it determined that a 
                                                 
 234. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 
U.S. 551, 554 n.2 (1977) (two small offices each staffed by four employees and 
each with annual sales of less than $3,000 created a sufficient nexus); 
Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562 
(1975) (single agent working out of his own home, even though he did not 
make any sales or take any orders, creates sufficient nexus); Aloha 
Freightways, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 701 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. 1998) 
(company’s trucks traveling just over three thousand miles per year in 
Massachusetts sufficient nexus to subject company to income tax). 
 235. See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 200, 214 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003). 
 236. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).  
 237. 21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003).  
 238.  504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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licensing agreement alone could not create the requisite 
“physical presence” under Commerce Clause nexus standards. 
Had the court simply followed Geoffrey v. South 
Carolina,239 a case which first stuck its neck out and led the 
way, it would have arrived at the correct outcome.  Instead, the 
court ventured on its own.  Along the way, it added the 
unnecessary requirement that the property be “tangible” in 
addition to being present, focused on dicta rather than the 
holdings of prior cases, and failed to fully analyze the practical 
impact of its decision.  While this decision is not final,240  PICs 
are currently free to grow in the Garden State. 
 
 
                                                 
 239.  437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).  
 240. See STATE OF NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, REFUND 
PROCEDURES FOR CLAIMS BASED ON THE TAX COURT’S DECISION IN LANCO, 
INC. V. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSURANCE (Nov. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/index.html? lanco.htm~mainFrame 
(last updated Nov. 24, 2004). 
